Come the "Grand Strategy"-Paper and the "Solana-Climate"-paper from the same source? - Even the London Guardian, in a report, highlightens how the content of the two papers, both calling for a new NATO strategic concept, coincide: Link
Before I throw in some other hints, I would like to show you another paper:
„At the end of 2007 the Security and Defence Agenda(SDA) roundtable examined the future for a European Disaster Relief Force. The International Crisis Group (ICG)’s Alain Délétroz had argued persuasively that the EU should be developing its own capacities, via the ESDP, and be creating its own military HQ in Brussels.
Giuliano Porcelli of the Council of the EU, however, was just one speaker to see that tangible improvements in the EU’s organisational capabilities for responding to international disasters of great magnitude with a unique EU voice would only arrive once the Lisbon Reform Treaty would be formally ratified and, subsequently, the EU External Action Service would be created.
Everyone was aware that only one set of armed forces exited in Europe and that a number of EU Member States preferred them to be wearing a NATO badge. ...Overall, a feeling emerged that something had to happen, and happen quickly. When disasters strike, the recipient governments are often overwhelmed by the array of various organisations that arrive to provide aid in various ways. As for the possible form and actual emergence of the European Disaster Relief Force, that might have to wait until the second half of
"Further study conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA) was needed to
exploit the optimal synergy between military and civilian procurement requirements
while avoiding duplication."
"The EU needed to streamline its decision-making capabilities when contemplating
sending forces in harm’s way, or risk losing global credibility as a serious disaster relief provider."
"We should not wait for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, but test the resources and
commitments we have made to note our shortcomings and correct them accordingly..."
The Paper „Towards A Grand Strategy For An Uncertain World”
operates heavily with the expression „certainity”.
The term „Certainity” is mentioned no less than in every introducing senctence of every chapter and of course in the concluding sentence of the report.
Together with the subtitle („renewing transatlantic partnership”), adding three „subdued” words to the existing eight, we have eleven words that form the title. There are mentioned 7 authors (heading the report) - 5 military men and 2 philosophers/sociologists, but another three further advisors wait subdued and hidden in the acknowledgements (Allen, Scowcroft, Moreton, p.152) - a fact that leads me to ask if there is another, eleventh author behind the text.
Anyway the authors acknowlede that they heavily borrowed from existing Security Papers which would also give a further explanation to the fact that it's sounding like the good old doctors voice. („Various published and unpublished writings, as well as professional expertise, form the sources to this document.")
And the dear reader should know, that Solana is behind the Transatlantic Alliance since 1995, see for example this YouTube-video from the Brussels Forum, which talks about the diplomacy in this Alliance from Dr. Solana: (min. 3.45-4.34, "challenges ahead")
Also: at least 2 of the authors have been under heavy Solana influence:
The US's top soldier under Bill Clinton and former Nato commander in Europe, Shalikashvili became Saceur, Nato's supreme allied commander in Europe, before Clinton appointed him chairman of the joint chiefs in 1993, a position he held until his retirement in 1997.
Viewed as one of Germany's and Nato's top military strategists in the 90s, Naumann served as his country's armed forces commander from 1991 to 1996 when - under Solana - he became chairman of Nato's military committee. On his watch, Germany overcame its post-WWII taboo about combat operations, with the Luftwaffe taking to the skies for the first time since 1945 in the Nato air campaign against Serbia."
I will put in here some of the many interesting parts of the report.
One big issue of the paper, the "Pre-emptive nuclear strike a key option, Nato told" has already been discussed widely in the Internet and the newpapers. The rest I will leave largely to their on words:
problem "religious fundamentalism"
Besides other problems that face the world and that give the authors the reason to call for a new world order under NATO, they name „the rise of the irrational” as a main danger. Their „ultimate example” is „the problem of religious fundamentalism" (pp.14f.).
„In some Western societies, faith in purely irrational belief systems has overtaken belief in religions that have moral and rational substance, as well as cultural roots. But symptoms such as the decline of interest in science reflect an intellectual decline that might have more immediately palpable social consequences in areas such as journalism, law, and even public health. It reflects a more general loss of respect for the value of evidence and argument.
As a direct consequence of the globalisation of information flows, all kinds of irrational belief or political fanaticism circulate freely in the public domain. Traits of the open society, such as freedom of speech, can then be used against themselves and against other liberties.” (p.39)
I am sure the auhtor(s) speak(s) of what they call „Conspiracy sites”.
But for me it sounds as what was said about Paul in Ephesus:
„Moreover ye see and hear, that not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul hath persuaded and turned away much people, saying that they be no gods, which are made with hands:
So that not only this our craft is in danger to be set at nought; but also that the temple of the great goddess Diana should be despised, and her magnificence should be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth". Acts 19, 26-27
They refer to it also at pp.22-23: „Enemies of democracies – including Islamist
terrorists – greatly rely on the internet and mobile-space created in free societies, and they use
them against those societies. The instruments of globalisation have given these non-state actors a
But they are sure to win the information battle for over long:
„The impact of the globalisation of information will therefore likely contribute to the decline of
authoritarianism and extremist ideology as political forces in the long term. In the short term,
however, both cyberspace and mobile-space are part of the problem, amplifying and globalising
current political and security threats. „(ibd.)
„The loss of the rational, in other words, is a loss of a particularly
valuable part of intellectual and moral certainty, and it
can lead people to seek certainty elsewhere, in anything from
common cults to extreme cases of fanaticism.
To trust in one’s rational faculty means to question and to
endure doubt. Sometimes the fear of doubt can be stronger
than the fear of death, when extreme doubt leads someone to
be receptive to the extreme certainty of a violent ideology –
the most fashionable of which (though by no means the only
one) is currently radical Islamism...
If the irrational and fanatical get out of hand, there is a risk
that, in the long term, the instability of uncertainties, the rise
of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age,
in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy
– but will not defend – are seriously jeopardised.
Achieving regional stability (farmer: this is a code word for an AOC- and
OSCE dominated world realizing and controlling their aims by NGO’s and Media)
– which includes finding a solution to the Israeli–Arab conflicts – can only be accomplished
at a higher strategic level. Solutions will lie in newer regional
balances, which will have to include key strategic interests,
such as questions of proliferation and access to raw materials." (p.58)
Their anchor point:
„Before defining an aim for a grand strategy, we need an
anchor point. Our anchor point is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, agreed
by the majority of the world’s nations". (p.88)
Circles of power
–" a vision on
concentric circles of partnership that we will elaborate on in Chapter 4." (p.91)
Just military power?
"This definition could, however, still be misunderstood as primarily
referring to military power. We see strategy as the application
of the means to achieve a political objective; and consequently,
a grand strategy as the art of using all elements
of power (of either a nation or an alliance of nations) to accomplish
a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a nation
or of an alliance of nations in peace and war. A grand
strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated
use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social,
moral, spiritual and psychological power available."
How to catch the enemies...
"One truly indispensable element of any strategy in the 21st
century is deterrence. This will no longer be deterrence by
punishment, nor the threat of total destruction, which served
us so well in preserving peace during the Cold War.
In the Post-Westphalian world, and against non-state actors,
such deterrence does not work. What is needed is a new deterrence,
which conveys a single, unambiguous message to all
enemies: There is not, and never will be, any place where you
can feel safe; a relentless effort will be made to pursue you and
deny you any options you might develop to inflict damage upon
"creating uncertainty in the opponent’s mind –
no longer reactively but proactively
Such a concept of interactive escalation requires escalation
dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks –
and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging
from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons. As flexible
escalation and de-escalation are the crucial instruments in
gaining and maintaining the initiative, fast decision making
is of the essence. The traditional forms and methods of governments
and international organisations will today (in a
world of instantaneous global communications) no longer be
capable of meeting this requirement. Thus a thorough review
and adaptation is required.
It is important, furthermore, to have dominance over the opponent’s
ability to calculate his risks. It is a very important
element of strategy to keep things unpredictable for the opponent,
who must never be able to know, or calculate, what
action we will take. It is essential to maintain this dimension
of psychological warfare by instilling fear in an opponent, to
retain an element of surprise and thus deny him the opportunity
of calculating the risk.
every step must be accompanied by a carefully orchestrated
and well coordinated media campaign, in which it
will again be vital to win and maintain the initiative. A modern
grand strategy must include a media strategy aimed at
winning the hearts and minds of people around the world. It
must ensure information dominance, and thus guarantee the
credibility of the action. It ought to be a ‘first strike’ media
strategy, aimed at hitting the headlines first..."p116
"It would be a dramatic mistake
not to act now to seek a new order and save as much as possible
of the international order – an order that is based on
good governance and democratic rule, and in which the rule
of law prevails.
First, whatever the future may bring, it is essential that the
West redefines itself and its role in the world. A first step
would be to mentally adjust the map we all carry in our heads.
We should no longer talk about two pillars, Europe and
America, deepening cooperation between one another.
Enlargement of NATO and the EU has created a common
democratic space, which runs from Finland to Alaska. Building
this space into a community with a sense of purpose in the
world is both our most urgent and our long-term task.
Reshuffle the roles of the actors to restored certainity."
"We also see, as an example
of what already works, the wider Western European Union
(WEU) treaty’s binding commitment incorporated into the
Maastricht Treaty, by which, in the case of attack, EU members
are bound to support each other militarily"
"UN Security Council authorisation is also mandatory for all
post-intervention stabilisation operations. Simultaneously, it
should designate a lead organisation or a lead nation to direct
subordinate UN bodies, such as the UNHCR, the IAEA, the
FAO and others, to cooperate in the theatre of operations. (farmer: ...and AOC)
We therefore propose that the UN should arrange for a ‘unity of command’
in all post-intervention operations(p. 120)
WE CALL FOR Laison teams between the UN and major international organisations,
such as NATO, the African Union, the EU, ASEAN
and the OSCE, and the introduction of regular situation
briefings of the UNSC by these regional organisations.
farmer: this reminds us at Hal Lindsey's 4 geographic zones
"the OSCE could, under such auspices, play
an important role as a sort of coordinating agent for NGOs,
which are, not infrequently, exceedingly reluctant to cooperate
with those who might be seen as ‘hard power’ elements" (p123)
Order of Command
"As an additional step, we propose a review of the existing set
of tools for other than military steps, such as sanctions, the
entire tool-kit of ‘defence diplomacy’, etc. This should be done
first in NATO, then coordinated with the EU, and thereafter
be brought to the attention of the OSCE or the UN."(132)
The steering committee
"as a first step towards a new and wider transatlantic bargain,
the establishment of a US–EU–NATO steering directorate
at the highest political level (143),
"NATO will always be the body in which a topic is discussed first, and that
those NATO members who are also EU members will undertake
not to deviate from their NATO vote when the issues are
discussed in EU bodies.
Thus, EU deliberations would become
discussions of how to implement a decision that NATO
has taken and to which the EU will contribute (under a ‘Berlin
Plus in Reverse’ or similar arrangement)." (144)
"‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ would be the mirror image, and would
see the EU coming to the aid of a NATO-led operation with
non-military assets and capabilities, on a case-by-case basis".( 132)
"The steering directorate would also be able to provide ideas
and considerations for other bodies, not least to put things on
the agenda of the G8, for that body to consider further.
The steering directorate would likewise be the ideal body to introduce
long-term issues into the practical arena.
Its immediate task will be the coordination of common responses
in crises where common interests are in danger. The
point of such a directorate would be to better liaise for the
common good, to coordinate who takes the lead on which
issue, and to ensure that the three entities support each other.
Of course, this could not happen without capabilities".(144)
New EU constitution. „Smuggled in” (sic)
„… a new treaty to replace the doomed ‘constitution’
has been negotiated and is presently
being smuggled in, thus avoiding the risk of having
European voters consulted on the matter.” (p.139)
Border control to allies and „cooperative bodies”
"It will, therefore, become increasingly vital in the coming years to
strengthen those international agencies that control borders
and customs. Frontex, the EU agency that looks at the control
of external borders, customs and border police, is an example
of a positive trend, which, we believe, needs to be developed.
For nations to control their borders in the coming years, they
may have to overcome the short-term concern of handing over
some responsibility for policing those borders to allied and
cooperative bodies (140)
"A European Homeland Security...
organisation should be established within the EU. Not a new
organisation, but one from within the EU. As with intelligence,
the availability of data is crucial in this. A central data
bank, which would catalogue individual countries’ relief capabilities,
would prove its worth at the first disaster. A standby
forces arrangement already exists in the UN." (141)
„In this context, the EU should also look at homeland security,
which can no longer be treated as a separate domain of internal
security” (140) = into the hands of SOLANA
"As far as intelligence is concerned, we propose that consideration
should be given to the establishment of a Joint NATO/
EU Intelligence Fusion Centre, to which both organisations
would report their corroborated intelligence findings for the
geographical zone that is defined by the area in which EU and
NATO zones of interest overlap." (142)
Give up souvereignity!
"Having thus hinted at the complexity of government decisions
in our time, we wish to express our conviction that the existing
form of stove-piped national governments, in which each
ministry jealously guards its sphere of influence, is no longer
the appropriate answer in the 21st century.
The future we are facing requires more, not less, international
integration; but as the national state is – and will remain
for the foreseeable future – the core of decision making, we
must stress that governments need to think about adapting
the organisation of government, as well as about dramatic
changes in national decision making." (142)
Speak with one voice
"the EU has, first, to speak with one voice, basing
its utterances on a common European Foreign and Security
Policy, which must not reduce the national responsibilities of
the EU member states but is the result of a process of close
consultation and coordination among the EU members, and
which will then be applied as a guideline for national policies.(sic)" (p.142)
Isn't it funny how similar are the pictures ofthe report and the Lemesurier-book?
"As events go from bad to worse,
it is more than likely that anxious, weary groups and nations,
only too glad to place all their burdens and responsibilities on other people's shoulders,
will increasingly tend to offer the New David temporal power and even military command".
The Armagedon Script, p.239.